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Abstract 
With the prospective exit of the UK from the European Union, a crucial question is whether EU 
Structural Funds have been beneficial for the country and which aspects of Cohesion Policy should be 
maintained if EU funds are to be replaced. This paper addresses this question through a twofold 
investigation, assessing not only whether but also how EU funds have contributed to regional growth 
in the UK from 1994 to 2013. We document a significant and robust effect of Cohesion Policy in the 
UK, with higher proportions of Structural Funds associated to higher economic growth both on the 
whole and particularly in the less developed regions of the country. In addition, we show that the 
strategic orientation of investments also plays a distinct role for regional growth. While concentration 
of investments on specific pillars seems to have no direct growth effects, unless regions can rely on 
pre-existing competitive advantages in key development areas, we unveil clear evidence that targeting 
investments on specific areas of relative regional need has a significant and autonomous effect on 
growth. These findings have important implications for the design of regional policy interventions in 
Britain after Brexit. 
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1. Introduction 
One of the consequences of UK’s exit from the European Union will be that the country will 
no longer be eligible to receive EU Structural Funds. This represents not only a potential 
financial loss in the area of local economic development policies but also a prospective 
problem of policy design – indeed, it has been argued that filling the policy vacuum 
generated by the loss of Cohesion Policy after Brexit will be far from simple (Bachtler & 
Begg, 2017). In this context, it appears timely to ask whether EU funds have contributed to 
fostering the economic performance of recipient UK regions and examine what have been the 
successful features of EU spending that should perhaps be maintained once regional policy 
responsibility becomes fully ‘repatriated’ to the national level.  
The existing economic literature provides rather little evidence on these important issues. 
Despite the bourgeoning research on the economic effects and overall effectiveness of EU 
Cohesion Policy, studies examining the contribution of structural funds on regional economic 
performance in the UK are far and few between (a recent exception, in the impact-assessment 
tradition, is Di Cataldo, 2017).
1
 The evidence produced by the broader European literature is 
also of limited help, as findings on the economic effects of the policy are not fully conclusive 
(cf. Dall’erba & Le Gallo, 2008; Becker et al., 2010, 2012; Bouayad-Agha et al., 2013; 
Cerqua & Pellegrini, 2017) and seem to vary across national and regional contexts (Crescenzi 
& Giua, 2018; Bachtrögler et al., 2018).  
                                                          
1
 Less recent studies often had either a narrower programme-specific focus (Armstrong & Wells, 2006) or 
focused on issues of governance and institutional fit (Gripaios & Bishop, 2006).  
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More importantly, the literature is also relatively moot on how the prioritising on specific 
expenditure categories may influence the effectiveness of Cohesion Policy expenditures. 
Only a handful of studies exist on this issue, providing mostly indirect evidence on the role of 
prioritising specific investment axes vis-à-vis balancing expenditures across different policy 
targets (Rodriguez-Pose & Fratesi, 2004), or on the role of targeting interventions to the local 
specificities and factor endowments of regions (Sotiriou & Tsiapa, 2015; Crescenzi & Giua, 
2016; Crescenzi et al., 2017).
2
  
In this paper we focus exclusively on the UK context and build on the literature assessing the 
strategic designs of EU policies to empirically assess not only whether but also how EU funds 
have contributed to improve the economic performance of UK regions. Using recently 
released data with detailed information on Structural Funds payments by programming period 
and by category of expenditures, we produce a unique analysis of the regional economic 
effect of Cohesion Policy in the UK, examining the role that aspects of design and fund-
deployment have had on this.  
We start by testing the economic returns of EU funds using annual data for 1994-2013. We 
find a significant and robust effect, showing that higher proportions of EU Structural Funds 
are associated to higher economic growth rates. This relationship appears strictly linear; even 
among the regions receiving the largest bulk of the funds we find no evidence of either 
threshold or exhaustion effects. Assignment into Objective 1 or Convergence status is 
positively and significantly associated with regional growth, a result which is mainly due to a 
positive effect of receiving such status (‘entering’ into the programme) rather than to being 
adversely affected by losing eligibility (‘de-assignment’).  
                                                          
2
 Policy design issues are more commonly addressed in the qualitative literature (see Piattoni & Polverari, 
2016), but at the expense of statistical inference and generalisation. 
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Subsequently, we turn our focus to the strategic orientation of investments, drawing on a 
consistent classification of expenditures along five development pillars, for the two 
programming periods 2000-06 and 2007-13. We focus on two key aspects: (a) the 
concentration of funds across a range of interventions and in areas of pre-existing regional 
strength; and (b) the ‘alignment’ between committed expenditures and measured regional 
‘needs’. While we find little evidence that focusing on any one of these pillars has direct 
growth impacts – concentration of funding seems to be on the whole harmful for growth, 
unless it concerns spending on an existing specialisation in innovation or tourism – we 
uncover clear evidence that misalignment between effort (allocation of funds to specific 
categories) and regional needs (areas of main weakness vis-à-vis other regions) significantly 
penalises the economic performance of a region. This suggests that investment allocation and 
fund-deployment strategies have real efficiency implications: carefully identifying and 
targeting the main socio-economic disadvantages of regions can increase the effectiveness of 
the policy interventions for any amount of available resources.  
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents a background discussion on the 
rationale behind EU development strategies, reviewing the existing literature assessing the 
effectiveness of different strategic designs and explaining our own conceptualisation of this. 
Section 3 discusses the data and estimation approach. Section 4 explains our approach to 
measuring regional needs and gives a descriptive picture of the distribution of relative 
regional need across the UK NUTS2 regions. Section 5 presents the first part of the empirical 
analysis, assessing the relationship between Cohesion Policy expenditure and economic 
growth. Section 6 examines instead the growth effects of fund-deployment characteristics 
(concentration, targeting). Section 7 discusses the implications of our findings and concludes. 
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2. The issue of policy design: literature, policy and conceptual frame 
The regional development policies promoted by the European Union have evolved over 
time. In its origin, EU Cohesion Policy was conceived as a tool to counterbalance the 
regional disparities inevitably emerging from the market system (Armstrong, 2011). The 
main focus was on physical capital investment, particularly transport infrastructure, and 
the primary objective was economic convergence (European Commission, 2014). 
Following political as well as academic criticism to this approach, the focus gradually 
shifted from redistribution to allocation and from large infrastructure investment to softer 
infrastructures (R&D, education) and a more diversified investment mix; while more 
recent reforms – stimulated further by a number of influential contributions (Barca, 2009; 
Farole et al., 2011; Barca et al., 2012; Camagni & Capello, 2015) – shifted the strategic 
orientation of Cohesion Policy towards more comprehensive and integrated interventions 
(Bachtler et al., 2017).  
According to the current vision, a differentiated (‘place-based’) approach in each regional 
context represents the key for the success of development strategies – infused with a 
‘smart specialisation’ perspective (McCann & Ortega-Argiles, 2015), based on fostering 
the key innovative assets of each region and on identifying key areas of weakness and the 
combination of advantages that can stimulate growth. 
In poorer regions, infrastructure provision is now mixed with important measures in other 
development areas such as education, business development, and the promotion of 
innovation. Moreover, the new policy paradigm gives increasing importance to local and 
regional actors in the definition of development strategies. Mobilising local players, it is 
claimed, allows to gain a deeper understanding of the specific needs and competitive 
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advantage of places and design bottom-up interventions accordingly (Barca et al., 2012). 
Regional policies carefully considering local preferences and specificities are regarded as 
superior to top-down approaches in their capacity to stimulate, otherwise untapped, 
economic potential.  
Following these changes, a small literature has started to emerge seeking to assess how the 
design of EU strategies conditions the effectiveness of Cohesion Policy. Building in part 
on the earlier work by Rodriguez-Pose and Fratesi (2004), who showed that wrongly-
targeted strategies overemphasising single development axes (e.g. transport infrastructure) 
are less growth-conducive, two recent studies examined specifically the issue of 
concentration of funds and the relative productivity of investments across axes. Sotiriou 
and Tsiapa (2015) looked at the case of Greece, finding that growth is faster in regions 
where the investment mix is related to the local endowments – i.e., that investing in one’s 
own area of specialisation matters, at least for some spending categories.  
Concerning the question of the economic returns of bottom-up policy designs, Crescenzi 
and Giua (2016) have shown that the most effective strategies are those mixing top-down 
with bottom-up approaches. An alternative line of investigation has been opened recently 
by the work of Crescenzi et al. (2017). Using a selected sample of 15 regions from across 
the EU, the authors find that congruence between regional socio-economic needs and 
spending priorities is a significant factor influencing the effectiveness of Cohesion Policy.  
Our analysis follows this emerging literature and seeks to provide a comprehensive 
assessment of fund-deployment strategies. Our conceptual frame identifies two, not 
necessarily orthogonal, axes along which such strategies are designed. The first concerns 
the issue of concentration. Concentrating expenditures in a small number of thematic 
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areas
3
 creates advantages of scale and resource mobilisation and thus has the potential to 
maximise the returns to investment. Inversely, however, concentration may be less 
efficient if there are diminishing returns to investment; while it may also give rise to 
problems of information (how to choose the appropriate thematic areas of intervention), 
coordination (how to maximise the benefits from intervening in one area if synergies with 
other areas are not fully exploited due to under-funding) and risk-diversification (what 
happens if the targeted area – say, tourism or industry – is negatively affected by a shock 
or if targeting in that policy area fails).  
The second axis concerns the issue of targeting. Targeting investments in the areas of 
relative strength may be an effective tool for maximising returns to investment and, 
ultimately, regional growth. However, in the presence of cross-thematic complementarities 
and/or in the absence of supply-side constraints within the targeted area, targeting may in 
fact be less effective for growth and less efficient economically. Take for example the case 
of a touristic area, such as Cornwall. Investing further on tourism and regeneration may 
have an obvious appeal, especially in relation to the information problem mentioned 
above. But it may be completely ineffective if further tourism development in the region is 
hindered not by supply-side constraints within the tourism sector (including the 
availability of land, of a workforce possessing relevant skills, or of branding initiatives) 
but, say, by accessibility (requiring investment in transport infrastructure) or by lack of 
supporting industries (e.g., legal and accounting services – requiring investments in 
business development and human resources). Theoretically, then, it is unclear whether 
concentration of funding (both thematic and geographical) and targeting on thematic areas 
                                                          
3
 Our discussion here focuses on the thematic dimension of fund-deployment, i.e., the allocation of funds across 
investment axes. But the frame used here applies similarly to the geographical dimension. In this case, the 
questions of concern are whether funds should be targeting particular regions at all (concentration) and, if so, 
whether they should concentrate on the more advanced (higher-capacity) or more needy (potentially higher-
returns) regions (targeting).  
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of advantage or on areas of regional need has positive growth effects. This becomes an 
empirical question, which we address in the remainder of this paper. In the next section we 
explain in detail how we operationalise empirically the conceptual frame presented here.  
 
3. Data and empirical approach  
Our analysis assesses three dimensions of EU funds, one related to the effect of total 
investments and two to the effectiveness of the design of EU investment programmes. The 
first dimension concerns the actual investment effort and its distribution across regions. For 
this, we use standard measures of assignment and intensity of treatment, as employed 
elsewhere in the literature. Assignment is captured by a dichotomous (dummy) variable 
taking the value of 1 for each region belonging to ‘Objective 1’ (for 1994-2006) or 
‘Convergence’ status (for 2007-2013). Intensity is measured as a continuous variable 
reflecting the proportion of EU funds paid to UK regions, specified alternatively in per capita 
terms or as a share of regional GDP. For this analysis we use data on total annual payments to 
the 37 UK NUTS2 regions from 1994 to 2013 derived from the Structural Funds database of 
the European Commission (DG Regional Policy).
4
  
The second dimension refers to the relative policy effort, i.e., the allocation of funds across 
investment pillars within regions. For this, we rely on a unique dataset of commitment 
allocations, reported at the level of specific fields of interventions aggregated by 
programming period for 2000-2006 and 2007-2013.
5
 Based on this, we constructed aggregate 
                                                          
4
 Payments from the 2007-2013 programming period extend to 2014 and 2015 under the so-called n+2 rule. As 
these potentially overlap with payments from the 2014-2020 programming period, which are not recorded in our 
data, these two years are excluded from our analysis. 
5
 This data has been provided to us with permission by the DG Regional Policy. We are grateful to Lewis 
Dijkstra, Domenico Gullo, and Hugo Poelman for facilitating this. 
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measures of commitment allocations along five key investment pillars corresponding to: (1) 
Transport infrastructure; (2) Business support; (3) Research technological development and 
innovation (RTDI); (4) Human resources; and (5) Tourism, culture and regeneration.
6
 The 
selection of these pillars has been inspired by macro-aggregations of expenditure categories 
defined by the European Commission in the two analysed periods, as well as by previous 
studies considering sub-divisions of structural funds by category (Rodriguez-Pose & Fratesi, 
2004; Sotiriou & Tsiapa, 2015)
7
. Following, we calculated the regional investment shares for 
each of these pillars (fund commitments in the pillar in the region divided by total fund 
commitments in the region) as well as a measure of concentration of effort (the sum of the 
squares of these shares based on a Herfindahl index), which we use in our empirical analysis.  
The third dimension relates to how funds have been targeted towards investment axes with 
respect to regional advantages and needs. Following Crescenzi et al. (2017), our main 
hypothesis is that targeting of expenditures towards areas of regional need (alignment 
between effort and need) can be growth-enhancing. As explained in section 2, a competing 
hypothesis is that growth is enhanced by allocation of funds into areas of advantage 
(prioritising on a region’s strengths). To examine these two hypotheses we have constructed a 
measure of specialisation (spending on one’s own area of advantage) and two measures of 
needs-effort misalignment (horizontal and vertical), as explained in the next section, which 
we treat as our policy variables. Following Sotiriou and Tsiapa (2015), we also implement a 
complementary test for the second hypothesis, by estimating separate growth regressions per 
                                                          
6
 We have harmonised these pillars across the two programming periods drawing on the more detailed sub-
categories from each period. See Table A1 in the online Appendix for details on our classification scheme. 
7
 Taken together, these classifications allow to cover almost the entirety of committed funds per period. For the 
2000-2006 period, only the category ‘Miscellaneous’, funds for Agriculture (included in the CAP in later and 
previous periods) and non-transport infrastructure are left out. For the 2007-2013 period, only funds for 
‘Technical assistance’, non-transport infrastructure and Institutional capacity are not considered. In total, we 
cover 91% and 97% of the total allocated funds for the 2000-2006 and the 2007-2013 periods, respectively.  
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expenditure category and examining the interaction effect between per capita expenditures in 
the category of interest and a measure of relative performance of each region in this category.  
For all three dimensions, our empirical analysis employs a specification of the following 
form:  
∆ ln (𝑌 𝑃⁄ )𝑖,𝑡
= β1ln(𝑌)𝑖,𝑡−1 + β2X𝑖,𝑡 + β3EU𝑖,𝑡 + φ𝑖 + τ𝑡 + ε𝑖,𝑡  (1) 
where  is the first-differencing operator, i and t index regions and time, respectively; 𝑌 is 
regional GDP; 𝑃 is population; X𝑖,𝑡 is a set of regional characteristics including the 
regional unemployment rate, the share of tertiary education degree holders in the regional 
workforce, the share of agricultural employment and a measure of innovation capacity 
(patent applications per 1000 inhabitants); EU𝑖,𝑡 is our measure relating to EU funds; φ𝑖 
and τ𝑡 are vectors of region-specific and time dummies capturing permanent differences in 
growth rates across regions and national business-cycle effects, respectively; and ε𝑖,𝑡 is a 
vector of iid residuals.  
When estimating equation (1) using the annual dataset, t indexes years, t-1 stands for 
values one year ago and all X𝑖,𝑡 and EU𝑖,𝑡 variables are defined contemporaneously and 
measured on an annual basis, while the dependent variable is the annual change in the log 
of per capita GDP. Instead, when using the period-specific dataset, t indexes programming 
periods; t-1 stands for the year prior to the start of programming period t; X𝑖,𝑡 and EU𝑖,𝑡  
are programming period averages; and the dependent variable is measured as the average 
annualised regional growth rate of GDP per capita. In all cases, standard errors are 
clustered at the NUTS2 level, the one at which Cohesion Policy eligibility is assigned, and 
all models are estimated with panel LSDV (fixed effects). 
12 
 
Although this research design does not offer an identification strategy, we note that our 
policy variables (funding commitments, misalignment measures, etc) are strictly pre-
determined and thus exogenous in a Granger sense. Concerns about selection (e.g., that 
more expenditures go to regions with high future growth potential) are further minimised 
by the inclusion of regional fixed effects and of the initial level of per capita GDP
8
; while 
concerns about confoundedness are also limited given the lack of complementarity 
between EU Cohesion Policy and domestic regionally identifiable capital expenditures 
(see below). We thus think of our estimates not only as general equilibrium effects but 
also as indicative of the direct effect of the policy variables – and thus also of the 
‘counterfactual’ of the absence of the policy treatment. 
EU Cohesion Funds represent only a small portion of total regional investments in the UK. 
For example, in the period 2000/01-2005/06, domestic regionally identifiable capital 
expenditures averaged £28.22 billion per annum. This contrasts with the €2.46 billion 
(approximately £1.72bn) of total annual funding (commitments) derived from EU Cohesion 
Policy during the 2000-2006 programming period. In those terms, EU Cohesion Policy 
represents only a small fraction of UK regional investments. It should be noted, however, that 
Cohesion Policy expenditures are much more concentrated, geographically and thematically, 
and targeted on more specific development activities. For example, in Wales total EU 
expenditure represented in the same period over 22% of total public investment; while across 
the UK, in the category of business and enterprise development, EU Cohesion Funds 
represented around one third of total regional investment. Importantly, London and the South 
East attract around 30% of regionally identifiable UK capital expenditure but only 6% of EU 
funds allocated to the UK; while, at the NUTS1 level, at which comparable data are available, 
                                                          
8
 In addition, GMM estimates, which control in part for endogeneity issues using distributed lags of the 
explanatory variables as instruments, produce on the whole qualitatively similar results (available upon request).  
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the regional allocation of EU funds seems completely uncorrelated to that of domestic UK 
capital expenditures.
9
 Thus, although a small proportion of total regional effort, EU Cohesion 
Policy appears to be largely independent of UK regional policy (at least in terms of the spatial 
allocation of domestic capital expenditures), consistent with the principle of additionality. For 
this reason, our focus in this paper is exclusively on the regional growth effects of EU funds.  
 
4. The measurement of regional advantage and need  
As noted, our analysis of the issue of targeting relies on measures of relative regional 
advantage and need. To measure these, we move beyond aggregate measures of performance, 
such as GDP per capita, and look instead at detailed socio-economic variables which map 
onto the five investment pillars to which our expenditure data relate. We started by selecting 
a number of socio-economic variables that measure the relative performance of regions along 
aspects that map directly onto the five investment pillars listed above. Each proxy variable 
has been chosen relying on existing literature approximating context conditions of the same 
or similar nature. These were: the stock of roads per inhabitant and per squared km of land 
(for the transport infrastructure pillar) (Crescenzi & Rodriguez-Pose, 2012; Del Bo & Florio, 
2012); the share of employed people in high-tech sectors and the number of patent 
applications per thousand inhabitants (for RTDI) (Griliches, 1990; Acs et al., 2002); the share 
of tertiary degree holders in employment and the (inverse of the) percentage of 
unemployment benefit claimants (for the human resources pillar) (Nehru et al., 1993); a 
measure of competitiveness (inverse of regional unit labour costs in manufacturing) and the 
                                                          
9
 The correlation coefficient for the two expenditures series in the 2000-2006 period is -0.056. All numbers 
quoted here come from own calculations, based on the Public Expenditure Statistical Analyses (PESA) reports 
of the Office for National Statistics (various years) and our own data on EU Cohesion Policy commitments and 
payments.  
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rate of investment per employee in manufacturing (for the business support pillar) 
(Fagerberg, 1988); and the numbers of tourist arrivals per inhabitant and of touristic 
establishments per 1000 inhabitants (for tourism, culture and regeneration) (Sinclair, 1998).
10
 
For each of these, we collected data for the four years to the start of each programming period 
and calculated average values across the four years, so as to capture the conditions 
characterising the regions in the period when the relevant funding commitments were being 
designated. We standardised these variables using the linear scale transformation method and 
aggregated them into five pillars. The resulting variables represent a vertical (within-pillar 
across-regions) measure of relative regional strength; and the inverse of these ranks 
represents instead a measure of relative regional need per pillar. A note of caution should be 
added here. Although, as mentioned, our definition of needs is validated by the widespread 
use in the literature of the selected indicators, our results are of course conditional on the 
assumption that these indicators capture successfully the relevant local needs in each policy 
pillar. In parts of the analysis we test the sensitivity of our results to this, by employing 
alternative measures for the definition of need (e.g., for the business support pillar – see 
footnote 19).  
To measure advantage we drew on the first type of rankings (relative strength) and assigned 
the pillar of strongest relative performance (lowest rank) of each region as this region’s area 
of advantage. By interacting this assignment indicator with our pillar-specific per capita 
investments, we derived a new variable (specialisation) measuring, for each region, the per 
capita expenditure on the investment pillar on which this region has a relative advantage 
                                                          
10
 All data come from Eurostat with the exception of data on unemployment and Gross Value Added which 
come from the Nomis database of the UK Office for National Statistics. Descriptive statistics on these and all 
other variables used in the analysis are available in Table A2 in the online Appendix, while a summary of 
variables used to calculate the relative performance of regions before each programming period is listed in Table 
A3. 
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compared to other regions. We use this measure to examine whether targeting expenditures 
on a region’s own area of strength enhances regional growth.11 
To measure need, we developed two complementary measures. The first is a vertical measure 
of overall regional need, which we obtain by taking the inverse rank of the vertical 
performance scores mentioned above and averaging them across the five pillars, for each 
region.
12
 The second is a horizontal measure of need, showing the intensity of relative need 
of each region in each investment pillar, which we derived by taking the same inverse-rank 
scores and ranking each pillar according to its score within each region.
13
 Subsequently, we 
implemented a similar analysis for the per capita expenditures, deriving a vertical (how 
regions rank nationally in terms of the per capita funding they receive) and a horizontal rank-
score (how pillars rank, within each region, in terms of their funding allocations relative to 
their allocations nationally).  
Based on these rank-scores, we proceeded to construct our two indicators of horizontal and 
vertical misalignment. Vertical misalignment is measured as the absolute difference between 
the vertical rank-score of funding commitments and the vertical rank-score of regional need. 
It thus captures how dissimilar is a region’s national ranking in terms of funds committed per 
capita to its national (vertical) ranking in terms of relative need. In turn, horizontal 
misalignment is measured as the absolute difference between the horizontal (within-regions) 
                                                          
11
 As noted, we also use an alternative to this test by taking the interaction between each standardised measure 
of strength (prior to ranking) per category and the per capita expenditures in the same category. Unlike the 
variable presented in the text, which tries to capture the total effect of expenditures targeting areas of advantage, 
the estimated coefficient for this interaction term captures the extra growth generated by each expenditure 
category as a region’s performance (advantage) in this category improves.  
12
 In our empirical analysis we complement this with an alternative measure of overall vertical need, calculated 
as the inverse rank of the regions with regard to their GDP per capita at the beginning of each programming 
period. 
13
 For example, for 2007-13 West Midlands ranked last in terms of its performance with regard to Human 
resources, showing a heightened ‘need’ in this pillar; but ninth in terms of Transport infrastructure, thus 
showing a much less urgent need there. For this region, ‘Human resources’ was ranked as a higher priority than 
‘Transport infrastructure’. 
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rank-score of commitments and the horizontal rank-score of regional need (across pillars 
within regions). It this captures how dissimilar is the allocation of committed funds across 
pillars within each region to the same region’s relative ranking of need, nationally, in each of 
the five pillars. For both measures, a value of zero shows perfect alignment between regional 
needs and the prioritisation of policy interventions; while higher values show diminishing 
congruence between effort and need. 
Figure 1 presents a descriptive picture of our measures of need, linked to the allocation of 
Cohesion Policy funds across investment pillars. The first map depicts the geographical 
distribution of our vertical measure of overall regional need (circles layer) against that of the 
overall funds committed to each of the regions (shaded layer) using, for ease of presentation, 
average values across the two programming periods of our data. Each of the other maps 
shows, for one of the five pillars, the position of the UK NUTS2 regions with regard to their 
allocation of EU funds in this pillar (measured as a share to total) and with regard to their 
ranking in terms of need in the same category (horizontal measures of need).
14
  
[Figure 1] 
As can be seen, there are sometimes sizeable differences in the two geographies of effort and 
of need; while the extent of alignment between effort and needs varies substantially across 
categories. Only one out of the five areas receiving the highest per capita commitments of EU 
funds is also classified as a ‘high need’ region (South Yorkshire) according to our 
measures
15; while the majority of regions classified as ‘high need’ rank in the medium-high 
category in terms of funds committed. Still, some degree of congruence is also present: the 
                                                          
14
 The measures of misalignment calculated from these indicators are presented in Figure A1 in the online 
Appendix.  
15
 As noted earlier, our analysis of ‘need’ departs from the GDP-based definition of performance and thus direct 
comparisons with the actual income levels of the regions cannot be made here.  
17 
 
majority of regions located in the broader South East, which have low per capita 
commitments, appear also as regions of low relative need. Among the pillar-specific 
measures, misalignment appears to be particularly high in the cases of Human Resources 
(where low-need regions in the South receive more funds, in part because of EU fund 
allocation rules) and Transport Infrastructure (where our measure of road density in per 
capita terms weighs heavily in favour of urban and metropolitan areas); and lowest in the 
case of RTDI (where a significant amount is allocated to the high-need Objective 1 regions 
and the old industrial heartlands).  
5. EU funds and economic growth in UK regions 
We start our empirical analysis by examining in this section the overall impact of EU 
structural funds on economic growth across the UK regions, i.e., the issues of effort and 
assignment as mentioned previously. The results of this analysis are illustrated in Table 1. 
In column (1) we present a parsimonious specification of our model, including region and 
year dummies but no further control variables. In this initial specification, we find clear 
evidence of a positive relationship between EU grants and regional growth. The estimated 
coefficient is significant at 1% and shows a rather sizeable effect – with a doubling of per 
capita funds (e.g., from our sample average of €27.70 to €55.40) associated to a growth rate 
higher by 0.23 percentage points (or by 8.8% based on average growth rates for the period 
1994-2013). Expressed in different terms, this shows that one additional euro of EU funds per 
capita (a cost of about €65m) would raise average per capita incomes by €1.87 (a gain of 
approximately £121m). The effect loses somewhat its statistical significance when controls 
are included in the model (column (2)), but it increases in magnitude, corresponding now to a 
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rise of average growth rates by 0.32pp for a doubling of EU funds.
16
 A similarly large, 
positive and statistically significant effect is obtained also in column (3), where we examine 
the effect of assignment into Objective 1 status. Our results show that regions obtaining 
Objective 1 funds grew on average by 0.8 percentage points faster than other regions, 
annually, during the 1994-2013 period. The inclusion of the Objective 1 dummy changes 
little the obtained beta-convergence coefficient (from 0.307 to 0.297) and thus the estimated 
effect of assignment cannot be seen as capturing an inverse income-selection effect, whereby 
poorer regions become assigned to Objective 1 status and at the same time grow faster due to 
neoclassical convergence.  
In column (4) we test for a non-linear effect of EU funds on economic growth. Previous 
studies have evidenced the presence of decreasing returns to Cohesion Policy expenditures in 
European regions (Becker et al., 2012; Cerqua & Pellegrini, 2017). In our estimation (column 
4), the quadratic term of EU funds is negative – consistent with the hypothesis of decreasing 
returns – but not statistically significant. This indicates that in the UK case, the level of EU 
expenditures has not been sufficiently high for decreasing returns to kick-in. Indeed, no 
region in our sample surpasses the ‘maximum desirable intensity’ threshold estimated by 
Cerqua and Pellegrini (2017) using EU28 data. In line with this, the positive and significant 
coefficient of the interaction term between the Objective 1 dummy and EU funds in column 
(5) shows that, even among the highly-funded Objective 1 regions, those receiving more 
funds are those displaying the fastest growth rates.  
Our next step is to examine whether the results obtained from the annual data replicate 
themselves across programming periods. To do so, we aggregate our annual data to the level 
of the three programming periods and re-estimate the models of columns (2) and (3) (see 
                                                          
16
 This positive relationship is also confirmed when EU funds are normalised by GDP (see Table A4 in the 
online Appendix).  
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columns (6) and (7)). As can be seen, the results remain particularly stable, providing 
additional confidence on the growth effects estimated from the annual data and suggesting 
that these effects are not driven merely by year-on-year variations, which are more likely to 
suffer from endogeneity problems. As a further test of robustness, in the last column of Table 
1 we examine whether the positive estimate found for assignment to Objective 1 status may 
be driven instead by a negative effect of ‘de-assignment’ (losing Objective 1 eligibility17). 
We do this by introducing separate dummies for regions entering and exiting Objective 1 
status. Our results show clearly that the relationship obtained earlier is not driven by ‘de-
assignment’ but exclusively by entry into Objective 1 status. This intuitive result increases 
further our confidence in the validity of our results and of our interpretation of them as 
showing evidence of a robust relationship between Cohesion Policy interventions and 
regional growth performance. 
[Table 1 here] 
6.  The impact of concentration and targeting  
The results of the previous section present evidence for the positive role played by Cohesion 
Policy in the UK. In this section we take our analysis further, to examine the role played by 
aspects of design, as discussed previously. We first look at the effect of concentrating 
Cohesion Policy interventions on specific investment pillars; and then move on to study the 
role of the alignment of investments with observed socio-economic needs of regions or 
alternatively with regional areas of specialisation.
18
 
                                                          
17
 Di Cataldo (2017) has found evidence of such a negative effect in the case of South Yorkshire.  
18
 Following a recommendation by one of the referees, we have tested all of our models for problems of spatial 
autocorrelation (Lagrange Multiplier test statistics for error and lag dependence are reported in Tables 2 and 3; a 
full set of results obtained from spatial lag fixed effects panel estimations using the -spregxt- module in Stata is 
reported in Tables A5 and A6 in the online Appendix; a fuller set of results, including tests for cross-lag 
dependence capturing spatial spillovers from the EU variables are available upon request). The tests raise little 
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6.1. Concentration  
Our examination of the issue of concentration is threefold. First, testing whether the positive 
effect found for Cohesion Policy interventions at large is specific to any particular 
expenditure category. Second, testing whether a disproportionate allocation of funds into any 
one category has tractable beneficial effects on regional growth. And, third, testing whether 
the overall concentration of funding produces in itself positive effects on regional growth. We 
present the results from these tests in Table 2.  
For completeness, we start in column (1) by examining whether the positive effect of EU 
funds found earlier (column (6) in Table 1) is also present in our commitments data. As can 
be seen, the coefficient on total per capita commitments is positive and statistically 
significant (albeit smaller than in the case of actual payments over the three programming 
periods). This positive effect does not appear to be driven by any one particular spending 
category. In column (2), where we introduce the per capita commitments separately for each 
pillar, no single category emerges as the most growth-conducive, as none of them passes the 
standard thresholds of statistical significance. Interestingly, on the whole, the pillar variables 
are jointly statistically significant, as reported in the F-test at the bottom of Table 2. Even 
though in statistical terms this indicates the presence of multicollinearity, in analytical terms 
it suggests that concentration of funds in specific categories does not contribute positively to 
regional growth, even if jointly funding is beneficial.  
[Table 2 here] 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
concern about estimation problems emanating from spatial autocorrelation and the estimated effects for our 
policy variables remain qualitatively (and in some cases even numerically) the same.  
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Similar evidence is obtained when we look instead at the sectoral shares over total 
commitments per region, as shown in column (3). The shares for Business development and 
Transport infrastructure return coefficients that are positive and marginally significant, jointly 
all shares are again statistically significant, but overall the results do not provide strong 
evidence of a positive effect of concentration of committed expenditures on growth. Indeed, 
our evidence suggests that, if anything, concentration may be harmful to regional growth: in 
column (4) the Herfindahl measure of concentration returns a negative and statistically 
significant coefficient.  
All our results seem to indicate that, in the UK case, thematic concentration of EU funds has 
no beneficial effect on growth. Instead, it appears that it is the combination of commitments 
across investment axes that creates positive synergies.  
 
6.2. Targeting  
We now turn to the examination of the growth effects of the three variables related to 
targeting. The core results from our analysis of this are reported in Table 3.
19
 As can be seen, 
we find strong evidence that lack of congruence between relative regional needs and the 
within-regions allocation of the available funds (horizontal misalignment) is negatively 
associated with regional growth. The obtained coefficient in column (1) is statistically 
significant and quite sizeable in magnitude, suggesting that a two-unit rise in horizontal 
misalignment (equal to 10% of the theoretical maximum) is associated with a decline in 
                                                          
19
 We have run a large number of robustness checks using alternative model specifications (e.g., no controls or 
controlling for the actual level of commitments instead of assignment) and definitions of effort (e.g., measured 
in absolute money terms) and need (e.g., using alternative socio-economic variables – for example, replacing 
our unit labour costs measure with a measure of average firm size for our measure of business need). Our 
results, available upon request, are very robust to such changes.  
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regional growth by 0.19 percentage points. This represents without doubt a rather significant 
economic cost. 
In contrast, our evidence suggests that vertical misalignment and our alternative measure of 
spending on one’s area of specialisation have no impact on regional growth. Vertical 
misalignment returns a highly insignificant effect, both when using our preferred sector-based 
definition (column (2)) and when using the alternative definition of need based on the ranking 
of regions in terms of their GDP per capita (column (3)). Likewise, the variable measuring 
expenditures in a region’s area of specialisation (column (4)) also returns a not statistically 
significant effect, indicating that, on the whole, targeting investments on a region’s area of 
advantage does not enhance regional growth.  
All of these results remain unchanged when we estimate a full model which includes all three 
variables linked to targeting of investments (column (5)). Vertical misalignment and targeting 
on specialisations remain fully insignificant statistically, while horizontal misalignment 
continues to have a negative and statistically significant effect on growth.  
The conclusion about the effect of spending on one’s area of specialisation is also supported 
by our further exploration of the issue, examining the interaction effect between spending and 
advantage as discussed earlier (results reported in Table A7 in the online Appendix). In this 
case, two pillars – RTDI and Tourism – return a positive effect when interacted with a 
region’s performance in the same area. In both cases, however, the direct effect of spending is 
negative, with the implication that the estimated interaction effect shows a relative, rather 
than an absolute, influence on regional growth (i.e., that spending on, say, tourism is more 
beneficial for touristic areas vis-à-vis others but not necessarily beneficial in absolute terms). 
Spending on areas of advantage does not seem to produce any growth effects, absolute or 
relative, for investments in Transport infrastructure and Business development; while the 
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effect is even negative for the case of Human resources (indicating that spending more on 
education in a region that already possesses an educational advantage is not growth-
enhancing). These results are consistent with the evidence presented in Tables 2 and 3. 
Spending in individual investment categories seems to produce limited and on the whole non-
traceable growth effects; while investing on one’s area of advantage does not have a 
universally beneficial effect – even though it confers a relative advantage to regions 
specialising in R&D and tourism.  
Invariably in all models examined, the only effect that comes out consistently as the main 
influence on growth (besides assignment/intensity addressed in section 5) is that of horizontal 
misalignment. We see this as evidence showing, not only that fund-deployment strategies at 
large matter for regional growth, but especially that targeting investments on a region’s 
relative needs is an important ingredient for an effective regional development strategy – 
independently from the actual effort (scale of investments) allocated to that region.  
[Table 3 here] 
7. Conclusions and policy implications 
The recent decision of Britain to exit the European Union has brought increased attention to 
the question of the effects of Cohesion Policy interventions in the country and to the future of 
regional policy after Brexit. Despite a sizeable literature examining the growth effects of 
Cohesion Policy, evidence of its effects in the particular case of the UK is scarce. Also 
limited is the evidence on the role that the prioritising of interventions into specific 
investment categories plays for the overall effectiveness of the policy and for regional growth 
at large.  
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In this paper we sought to address these questions using previously unused data for the UK 
covering three programming periods with detail on funding allocations across different 
investment categories. Inspired by some – rather selective – evidence on the issue of 
targeting offered recently by Crescenzi et al. (2017), we developed a novel methodology 
which allowed us to measure the alignment between regional needs and the prioritising of 
commitments across investment pillars; and to examine, on the basis of this, how the level, 
concentration and targeting of investments impacts on regional growth.  
Our results provide a unique picture with regard to the role of EU funds for regional growth 
in the UK. We have shown that the level of funds allocated to regions has a positive and non-
exhaustible effect on growth, suggesting that Cohesion Policy interventions are productive 
irrespective of their scale. Further, we have shown that assignment into Objective 1 status 
also has a positive growth effect, which is additional to that of actual expenditures (Table 1, 
column (5)) and non-symmetric (Table 1, column (8)). Concentration of spending, however, 
in any one investment pillar does not appear to bear an advantage. Although spending in 
transport and business development seems to be marginally more beneficial, by and large it is 
the total commitments that account for the positive effect of Cohesion Policy on growth. 
Indeed, over-concentration of commitments across categories seems, if anything, to be 
negatively associated with regional growth. This applies also to the case of concentration on 
specific areas of advantage. Our investigation of this showed that expenditures targeting areas 
of regional advantage do not produce positive growth effects on the whole: such targeting 
was found to have a positive effect only vis-à-vis other regions and only for regions 
specialising in innovation or tourism.  
The key finding in our analysis concerns the impact of misalignment between the targeting of 
investment efforts and relative regional needs. On the one hand, the finding that vertical 
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misalignment does not exert an influence on regional growth suggests that allocation of funds 
to regions is beneficial irrespective of whether these are the most needy in terms of socio-
economic indicators and, indeed, in terms of initial level of GDP per capita. This is on the 
whole a favourable outcome for Cohesion Policy: it suggests that Cohesion Policy 
interventions are highly productive irrespective of place and local conditions and, thus, that 
principles of allocation favouring poorer regions have no efficiency costs. On the other hand, 
the finding that horizontal misalignment between regional needs and investment allocations 
has a strong negative effect on regional growth speaks directly to the importance of giving 
due consideration to the local socio-economic context – and needs – in the design and 
prioritising of Cohesion Policy interventions. It is interesting to note that this is broadly the 
direction followed by Cohesion Policy in recent years – with more emphasis to ‘place-based’, 
tailored interventions, that are more sensitive to local specificities and consider more 
carefully local socio-economic assets and needs. Our results seem to vindicate and reinforce 
this approach.
20
   
Our results also have strong implications in relation to Brexit. Cohesion Policy has been over 
a long period a significant stimulant to regional and national growth and, due to its focus on 
economically backward regions, a significant force for regional convergence in the country. 
The prospective withdrawal of the UK from the EU and the loss of eligibility for Cohesion 
Policy funding will thus not only deprive the UK’s regional economies from an important 
source of investment funds but most definitely also from a mechanism via which forces of 
economic divergence have been in the past – at least partly – neutralised. It follows that 
policy efforts in the post-EU era, such as the ‘Shared Prosperity Fund’ proposed by the UK 
Government as a replacement of EU funds, should concentrate on developing a similarly-
                                                          
20
 It must be noted, however, that our findings are specific to the UK case. The extent to which these results 
generalise to other countries and across the EU at large is an open question, which we hope to address in future 
research.  
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funded regional development policy which will substitute for the withdrawal of the Cohesion 
Policy interventions and, indeed, improve on these. On the basis of our results, positive 
features to maintain include the EU’s approach to multi-annual programming and area 
designation (e.g., Objective 1 – as our results show an additional growth advantage from 
this). Inversely, features to improve upon would include perhaps an upping in the level of 
spending (as, at the level of EU expenditures in the country, we do not find any evidence of 
diminishing returns to investments), a move away from concentration of funds in specific 
investment categories unless the regional structure is already predisposed for a good use of 
such investments and, above all, an increased attention to targeting of investments so that 
they match the specific pre-existing weaknesses of each region.  
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Table A3 Variables used to calculate performance indicators in the five pillars 
 
Table A4 EU funds as share of GDP and economic growth in UK NUTS2 regions, 1994-
2013  
 
Table A5 Spatial Panel Lag with Fixed-Effects (SAR-XT) for models of Table 2 
 
Table A6 Spatial Panel Lag with Fixed-Effects (SAR-XT) for models of Table 3 
 
Table A7 Sectoral specialisation and EU funds per capita by pillar in UK regions, 2000-
2013 
 
Table A8 Main results displaying coefficients of control variables 
  
32 
 
Tables in the main text 
 
Table 1 
EU funds and economic growth in UK NUTS2 regions, 1994-2013 
  Annual data Programming periods 
Dep. Variable: Δ ln GDP per capita (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
              
  lagged ln GDP per capita -0.220*** -0.307*** -0.297*** -0.307*** -0.303*** -0.190*** -0.182*** -0.183*** 
 
(0.0390) (0.0350) (0.0340) (0.0351) (0.0364) (0.0243) (0.0246) (0.0146) 
EU funds per capita 0.000084*** 0.000114** 
 
0.000135* 0.000132* 0.000083* 
  
 
(2.95e-05) (4.49e-05) 
 
(7.67e-05) (6.96e-05) (4.21e-05) 
  EU funds per capita squared 
   
-1.05e-07 
 
  
  
    
(3.89e-07) 
 
  
  Objective 1 regions 
  
0.00857*  0.00885*   0.00755*** 
 
   
(0.00437)  (0.00516)   (0.00247) 
 (Obj1 regions) x (EU funds per capita) 
    
0.000082**   
  
     
(3.27e-05)   
  Obj1 status: entering 
     
  
 
0.0108** 
      
  
 
(0.00480) 
Obj1 status: exiting 
     
  
 
0.00389 
      
  
 
(0.00582) 
      
  
  
Controls 
 
✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Region dummies ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Year/programming period dummies ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Observations 693 613 613 613 613 109 109 109 
R-squared 0.751 0.778 0.776 0.778 0.778 0.953 0.953 0.953 
NUTS2 regions 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 
VIF statistic (overall) 1.03 1.62 1.60 3.06 2.17 1.99 1.95 1.80 
Clustered standard errors at NUTS2 level in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Year dummies included in columns (1)-(5), programming period dummies included in columns (6)-(8). EU funds per capita: payments 
per year (columns (1),(2),(4),(5)); payments per programming period (column (6)). 
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Table 2 
Sectoral concentration of EU funds by programming period and economic growth in UK 
NUTS2 regions, 2000-2013 
Dep. Variable: Δ ln GDP per capita 
 Funds per capita Shares of total  
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Initial ln GDP per capita -0.124*** -0.102*** -0.130*** -0.130*** 
 
(0.0350) (0.0258) (0.0271) (0.0238) 
EU funds per capita 2.36e-05*    
 
(1.35e-05)    
EU funds for:     
Human resources  -9.94e-05 -0.0136  
 
 (0.000507) (0.0293)  
Transport infrastructure  0.000738 0.100*  
 
 (0.000860) (0.0580)  
RTD & Innovation  -9.06e-05 0.0277  
 
 (5.83e-05) (0.0401)  
Tourism, culture and regeneration  0.000140 -0.0279  
 
 (0.000258) (0.0275)  
Business development  0.000487 0.0292*  
 
 (0.000292) (0.0151)  
Concentration of funds     -0.0224** 
 
   (0.0104) 
Programming period 2007-2013 -0.0163** -0.0117* -0.0158 -0.0193*** 
 (0.00693) (0.00620) (0.0103) (0.00678) 
Controls ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Region dummies ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
LM lag 0.1231 0.0025 0.1565 0.1022 
 (0.726) (0.960) (0.692) (0.749) 
LM error 0.6194 0.0087 0.3866 0.5528 
 (0.431) (0.926) (0.534) (0.457) 
VIF statistic (overall) 1.83 3.65 3.64 2.18 
Observations 74 74 74 74 
R-squared 0.974 0.983 0.981 0.979 
NUTS2 regions 37 37 37 37 
Joint significance of EU funds variables: 
F test (p-value) 
 
4.579 
(0.00247) 
2.570 
(0.0435) 
 
Clustered standard errors at NUTS2 level in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. EU funds per capita: commitments per 
programming period. 
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Table 3 
Misalignment between regional targets and regional needs and economic growth in UK 
NUTS2 regions, 2000-2013 
Dep. Variable: Δ ln GDP per capita (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  
   
 
Initial ln GDP per capita -0.128*** -0.123*** -0.123*** -0.123*** -0.127*** 
 
(0.0285) (0.0312) (0.0308) (0.0310) (0.0291) 
Horizontal misalignment  -0.000945** 
  
 -0.000915** 
 
(0.000437) 
  
 (0.000451) 
Vertical misalignment (needs-based)  0.000106 
 
 0.000152 
 (0.000347) 
 
 (0.000341) 
Vertical misalignment (GDPpc-based)  
 
1.78e-05 
 
 
 
 
(0.000252) 
 
 
Spending in area of specialisation    -0.00194 -0.000016 
    (0.00688) (0.000028) 
Objective 1 regions 0.0131** 0.0128** 0.0128** 0.0138** 0.0147** 
 
(0.00610) (0.00507) (0.00516) (0.00522) (0.00626) 
Programming period 2007-2013 -0.0136* -0.0133* -0.0131* -0.0132* -0.0145** 
 (0.00675) (0.00717) (0.00702) (0.00694) (0.00695) 
Controls ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Region dummies ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
LM lag 0.3775 0.3202 0.3212 0.2510 0.2622 
 (0.539) (0.572) (0.571) (0.616) (0.609) 
LM error 1.0925 0.7320 1.1500 0.6222 0.5439 
 (0.296) (0.392) (0.284) (0.430) (0.461) 
VIF statistic (overall) 1.88 2.12 1.93 2.03 2.18 
Observations 74 74 74 74 74 
R-squared 0.979 0.976 0.976 0.976 0.979 
NUTS2 regions 37 37 37 37 37 
Clustered standard errors at NUTS2 level in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
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Tables in the online Appendix 
 
Table A1 EU investment pillars and source of aggregation from 2000-2006 and 2007-
2013 periods 
Investment pillar 
Fields of Intervention (FOIs),  
2000-2006 
Fields of Intervention (FOIs),  
2007-2013 
Transport infrastructure 
Priority theme 31: Transport 
infrastructure (sub-categories 311-319) 
Priority theme: Transport Infrastructure 
(sub-categories 16 to 32) 
Research Technological Development 
& Innovation (RTDI) 
Priority theme 18: Research, 
technological development and 
innovation (RTDI) (sub-categories 181-
184) 
Priority theme: Research and 
technological development (R&TD), 
innovation and entrepreneurship (sub-
categories 01-07 and 09) 
Human resources 
Priority theme 2: Human resources 
(sub-categories 21-25) 
Priority theme: Increasing the 
adaptability of workers and firms, 
enterprises and entrepreneurs (sub-
categories 62-64); 
Priority theme: Improving access to 
employment and sustainability (sub-
categories 65-70); 
Priority theme: Improving the social 
inclusion of less-favoured persons (sub-
category 71); 
Priority theme: Improving human capital 
(sub-categories 72-74); 
Priority theme: Mobilisation for reforms 
in the fields of employment and 
inclusion (sub-category 80) 
Tourism, culture and regeneration 
Priority theme 17: Tourism (sub-
categories 171-174); 
Priority theme 35: Planning and 
rehabilitation (sub-categories 351-354) 
Priority theme: Tourism (sub-categories 
55-57); 
Priority theme: Culture (sub-categories 
58-60); 
Priority theme: Urban and rural 
regeneration (sub-category 61) 
Business development 
Priority theme 15: Assisting large 
business organisations (sub-categories 
151-155) 
Priority theme 16: Assisting SMEs and 
the craft sector (sub-categories 161-
167) 
Priority theme: other investment in firms 
(sub-category 8) 
Source: DG Regional Policy. 
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Table A2 Descriptive statistics 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. 
Annual data 
Δ ln GDP per capita 656 0.027 0.043 
ln GDP per capita 693 10.03 0.310 
EU funds per capita 740 27.70 37.32 
EU funds as share of GDP 693 0.0013 0.0019 
Objective 1 regions 740 0.081 0.273 
Percentage of unemployment benefit claimants 726 2.185 1.105 
Patent applications per thousand inhabitants 703 0.078 0.052 
Percentage of employed people with tertiary education 735 29.35 8.452 
Percentage of people employed in agriculture 693 2.534 2.669 
Programming period data 
Annualised GDP pc growth rate 109 0.032 0.029 
Annualised ln GDP pc at beginning of programming period 109 9.951 0.342 
EU funds (payments) per capita (annualised) 111 28.21 31.91 
EU funds (payments) as share of GDP (annualised) 109 0.0014 0.0019 
EU funds (commitments) per capita for:    
Transport infrastructure 74 11.91 32.39 
RTD & Innovation 74 30.17 45.47 
Human resources 74 105.92 80.26 
Tourism, culture and regeneration 74 20.54 38.04 
Business development 74 60.23 66.63 
Total 74 263.86 276.76 
Share of EU funds (commitments) for:    
Transport infrastructure 74 0.02 0.05 
RTD & Innovation 74 0.13 0.12 
Human resources 74 0.55 0.19 
Tourism, culture and regeneration 74 0.07 0.06 
Business development 74 0.24 0.13 
Concentration (Herfindahl) index  74 0.45 0.20 
Variables used for calculating 'regional needs': 
   
Km of roads per inhabitant  74 8.17 4.11 
Km of roads per square km  74 3.06 2.65 
Touristic establishments per 1000 inhabitants 74 1.85 2.42 
Tourist arrivals per inhabitant 74 1.69 1.44 
Patent applications per thousand inhabitants  74 0.08 0.05 
Percentage of people employed in high-tech  74 5.05 1.79 
Percentage of employed people with tertiary education  74 27.46 5.74 
Percentage of unemployment benefit claimants  74 1.84 0.80 
Per employee investment in manufacturing 74 319.87 224.39 
Ratio of GVA to wages & salaries in manufacturing 74 2.20 1.68 
Dissimilarity indices:    
Vertical misalignment (needs-based) 74 8.48 6.18 
Vertical misalignment (GDPpc-based) 74 6.50 5.67 
Horizontal misalignment 74 9.00 2.43 
 
37 
 
Table A3 Variables used to calculate performance indicators in the five pillars 
 
Variable 
Approximating regional 
conditions in: 
Km of roads per inhabitant  
Transport infrastructure 
Km of roads per square km  
  
Touristic establishments per 1000 inhabitants Tourism, culture and 
regeneration Tourist arrivals per inhabitant 
  
Patent applications per thousand inhabitants  Research, Technological 
Development and Innovation Percentage of people employed in high-tech  
  
Percentage of employed people with tertiary education  
Human resources 
Percentage of unemployment benefit claimants (inversed) 
  
Investment in manufacturing per employee 
Business development 
Ratio of GVA to wages & salaries in manufacturing 
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Table A4 EU funds as share of GDP and economic growth in UK NUTS2 regions, 1994-2013  
 
  Annual data Programming periods 
Dep. Variable: Δ ln GDP per capita (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
            
Initial ln GDP per capita -0.217*** -0.304*** -0.305*** -0.301*** -0.188*** 
 
(0.0382) (0.0340) (0.0343) (0.0356) (0.0241) 
EU funds as share of GDP 1.172** 1.729** 2.383 1.782 1.226* 
 
(0.449) (0.839) (1.590) (1.589) (0.615) 
EU funds as share of GDP squared 
  
-66.32 
 
  
   
(140.6) 
 
  
Objective 1 regions 
   
0.00755   
    
(0.00607)   
(Obj1 regions) x (EU funds as share of GDP) 
   
1.295**   
    
(0.561)   
     
  
Controls 
 
✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Region dummies ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Year/programming period dummies ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Observations 693 613 613 613 109 
R-squared 0.750 0.777 0.777 0.777 0.952 
NUTS2 regions 37 37 37 37 37 
Clustered standard errors at NUTS2 level in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. EU funds as share of GDP: payments per year (columns (1)-(4); payments per 
programming period (column (5)). 
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Table A5 Spatial Panel Lag with Fixed-Effects (SAR-XT) for models of Table 2 
 
Dep. Variable: Δ ln GDP per capita 
 Funds per capita Shares of total  
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Spatial lag of GDP pc growth 0.245 0.137 -0.178 -0.247 
 (0.286) (0.275) (0.301) (0.309) 
Initial ln GDP per capita -0.113*** -0.0944** -0.136*** -0.138*** 
 
(0.0356) (0.0368) (0.0355) (0.0332) 
EU funds per capita 2.30e-05**    
 
(1.08e-05)    
EU funds for:  -8.75e-06 -0.0143  
Human resources  (6.74e-05) (0.0244)  
 
 0.000100 0.105*  
Transport infrastructure  (9.74e-05) (0.0589)  
 
 -9.80e-05 0.0290  
RTD & Innovation  (7.67e-05) (0.0410)  
 
 2.22e-05 -0.0264  
Tourism, culture and regeneration  (4.42e-05) (0.0410)  
 
 6.50e-05 0.0314  
Business development  (4.46e-05) (0.0188)  
 
   -0.0263** 
Concentration of funds     (0.0104) 
 
-0.00638 -0.00666 -0.0232 -0.0303* 
Programming period 2007-2013 (0.0149) (0.0145) (0.0184) (0.0172) 
 0.245 0.137 -0.178 -0.247 
Controls ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Region dummies ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
LM SAC 2.0932 2.6307 0.0714 2.9804 
 (0.351) (0.268) (0.965) (0.225) 
Observations 74 74 74 74 
R-squared (R2h) 0.426 0.511 0.335 0.346 
NUTS2 regions 37 37 37 37 
Clustered standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. EU funds per capita: commitments per programming 
period. 
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Table A6 Spatial Panel Lag with Fixed-Effects (SAR-XT) for models of Table 3 
 
Dep. Variable: Δ ln GDP per capita (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  
   
 
Spatial lag of GDP pc growth 0.151 0.137 0.169 0.187 0.152 
 (0.274) (0.292) (0.313) (0.311) (0.303) 
Initial ln GDP per capita -0.120*** -0.115*** -0.115*** -0.113*** -0.120*** 
 
(0.0344) (0.0366) (0.0367) (0.0371) (0.0362) 
Horizontal misalignment  -0.000949* 
  
 -0.000946* 
 
(0.000471) 
  
 (0.000499) 
Vertical misalignment (needs-based)  9.76e-05 
 
 0.000110 
 (0.000334) 
 
 (0.000329) 
Vertical misalignment (GDPpc-based)  
 
7.90e-05 
 
 
 
 
(0.000318) 
 
 
Spending in area of specialisation    -0.00394 -0.000527 
    (0.00950) (0.00960) 
Objective 1 regions 0.0137** 0.0133** 0.0132** 0.0154* 0.0139* 
 
(0.00587) (0.00626) (0.00631) (0.00795) (0.00781) 
Programming period 2007-2013 -0.00820 -0.00843 -0.00721 -0.00657 -0.00843 
 (0.0136) (0.0145) (0.0149) (0.0149) (0.0145) 
Controls ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Region dummies ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
LM SAC 0.0046 0.3351 0.0985 0.1436 0.3278 
 (0.998) (0.846) (0.952) (0.931) (0.849) 
Observations 74 74 74 74 74 
R-squared (R2h) 0.414 0.420 0.428 0.432 0.413 
NUTS2 regions 37 37 37 37 37 
Clustered standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table A7 Sectoral specialisation and EU funds per capita by pillar in UK regions, 2000-
2013 
  
  
Dep. Variable: Δ ln GDP per 
capita 
EU funds pc for / initial performance in:  
Human resources Transport infrastructure RTD & Innovation 
Tourism, culture 
and regeneration 
Business 
development 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
            
Initial ln GDP per capita -0.0931*** -0.138*** -0.138*** -0.158*** -0.112*** 
 
(0.0250) (0.0253) (0.0245) (0.0188) (0.0253) 
EU funds per capita 0.000216*** -8.71e-05 -6.66e-05* -0.000167*** 6.29e-05* 
 
(7.26e-05) (0.000165) (3.90e-05) (2.82e-05) (3.21e-05) 
Performance indicator 0.00809 0.0764 0.0331*** 0.0101 0.00612 
 
(0.0203) (0.0658) (0.0109) (0.0238) (0.00414) 
(EU funds pc) x (Performance 
indicator) 
-0.000257*** 3.16e-05 0.000492*** 0.000329** 4.29e-05 
(7.46e-05) (0.000206) (0.000179) (0.000129) (0.000122) 
Vertical misalignment -3.34e-05 -0.000134 -0.000454 -0.000181 0.000160 
 
(0.000279) (0.000337) (0.000301) (0.000321) (0.000338) 
Horizontal misalignment -0.000586 -0.000770* -0.000862** -0.00101** -0.000568* 
 
(0.000494) (0.000399) (0.000383) (0.000402) (0.000340) 
Objective 1 regions 0.000540 0.0196** 0.00969** 0.0282*** 0.0112* 
 
(0.00880) (0.00844) (0.00452) (0.00380) (0.00564) 
      
Programming period 2007-2013 -0.0272*** -0.0116 -0.0164** -0.00426 -0.0147** 
 (0.00600) (0.00750) (0.00716) (0.00521) (0.00671) 
Controls ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Region dummies ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Observations 74 74 74 74 74 
R-squared 0.984 0.982 0.985 0.986 0.984 
NUTS2 regions 37 37 37 37 37 
Clustered standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. EU funds per capita: commitments per programming 
period. As noted in the text, the measures of performance are composite indexes of base socio-economic variables. For each 
model, variables entering in the composite index of performance (e.g. the shares of unemployed and tertiary educated for the 
case of the ‘human resources’ model), are excluded from the list of controls in the same specifications.   
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Table A8 Main results displaying coefficients of control variables 
 
  Annual data Programming period data 
Dep. Variable: Δ ln GDP per capita (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Initial ln GDP per capita -0.307*** -0.297*** -0.130*** -0.127*** 
 
(0.0350) (0.0340) (0.0238) (0.0291) 
EU funds per capita 0.000114**   
 
 
(4.49e-05) 
  
 
Objective 1 regions  
0.00857* 0.00906* 0.0147** 
 
 
(0.00437) (0.00474) (0.00626) 
Concentration of funds (Herfindahl index)   
-0.0181*  
 
  
(0.0103)  
Horizontal misalignment     
-0.000915** 
    
(0.000451) 
Vertical misalignment    0.000152 
    (0.000341) 
Spending in area of specialisation    -0.000016 
    (0.000028) 
Patent applications per 1000 inhabitants 0.100 0.105 0.233*** 0.172*** 
 (0.0962) (0.0945) (0.0702) (0.0616) 
Employed people with tertiary education 0.000335 0.000358 0.000187 8.71e-05 
 (0.000227) (0.000229) (0.000152) (0.000146) 
Agricultural employment -0.000409 -7.65e-05 -0.00357 -0.00442 
 (0.00162) (0.00173) (0.00303) (0.00326) 
Unemployment benefit claimants -0.0237*** -0.0243*** -0.00912 -0.00836* 
 (0.00466) (0.00476) (0.00579) (0.00453) 
Programming period 2007-2013   -0.0193*** -0.0138* 
   (0.00678) (0.00703) 
Region dummies ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Year/programming period dummies ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Observations 613 613 74 74 
R-squared 0.778 0.776 0.980 0.981 
NUTS2 regions 37 37 37 37 
Clustered standard errors at NUTS2 level in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Year dummies included in columns 
(1)-(2), programming period dummies included in columns (3)-(4). EU funds per capita: payments per programming period. 
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Figures in the main text and in the online Appendix 
 
 
Figure 1: EU funds spent by category and needs of NUTS2 regions, 2000-2006 & 2007-
2013 
 
 
Figure A1: Misalignments targeting-needs  
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Figure in the main text 
Figure 1 
EU funds spent by category and needs of NUTS2 regions, 2000-2006 & 2007-2013 
   
 
  
Note: Measures of relative regional need (circles) and shares of EU fund commitments (shades areas) as 
described in the text. Darker shades correspond to higher shares of EU funds. Larger circles correspond to 
higher values of relative need (categorised by tercile as high, medium and low). 
Figure in the online Appendix 
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Figure A1 Misalignments targeting-needs  
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Categories of misalignment (high, medium, low) defined on the basis of quantiles. 
 
 
